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1  | INTRODUC TION
Despite the predominant measure in European Union (EU) nature 
conservation law – the Habitats Directive1 – passing its fitness 
check,2 the status of nature conservation in the EU does not look 
good.3 Habitats – especially the European priority areas forming the 
Nature 2000 network established under the Habitats Directive – are 
under constant pressure due to human activities. During the eco‐
nomic crisis that started in 2008, reforms of permitting procedures 
took place in several Member States to foster economic recovery.4 
The pursuit of climate change mitigation highlights the at times diffi‐
cult relationship between nature conservation and renewable energy 
projects.5 More generally, the pursuit of economic welfare, coupled 
with the abundant supply of agricultural products, are a constant 
threat to this environmental field.6
Member States and project developers search for as much room 
as possible to pursue their activities under EU and national nature 
conservation legal frameworks. One provision of the Habitats 
Directive seems to attract particular creativity of national legisla‐
tors, public authorities and undertakings: Article 6(3).7 This provision 
requires public authorities to assess the effects of any plan or proj‐
ect that, potentially, significantly affects the conservation goals and 
status of a Natura 2000 site. If a plan or project has a negative effect 
on such goals, authorization should be denied. Member States 
clearly have an incentive to avoid this provision halting socio‐eco‐
nomic development, including in the field of energy transition. The 
1 Council	Directive	(EEC)	92/43	of	21	May	1992	on	the	Conservation	of	Natural	Habitats	
and of Wild Fauna and Flora [1997] OJ L305/42 (Habitats Directive).
2 Commission	 (EU),	 ‘Evaluation	 Study	 to	 Support	 the	 Fitness	 Check	 of	 the	 Birds	 and	
Habitats Directives’ (March 2016) <http://ec.europa.eu/envir onmen t/natur e/legis latio n/
fitne ss_check/ docs/study_evalu ation_suppo rt_fitne ss_check_nature_direc tives.pdf>.
3 European	Environment	Agency	(EEA),	‘Environmental	Indicator	Report	2018’	(EEA	2018).
4 For	a	discussion	on	legislative	reforms	to	speed	up	development	consent	procedures,	see	
the	contributions	in	B	Vanheusden	and	L	Squintani	(eds),	EU Environmental Planning Law 
Aspects of Large‐scale Projects (Intersentia 2016).
5 See	 on	 this	 tension	 Case	 C‐2/10,	 Azienda Agro‐Zootecnica Franchini sarl and Eolica di 
Altamura Srl v Regione Puglia,	ECLI:EU:C:2011:502.
6 EEA,	Effects of Air Pollution on European Ecosystems (EEA 2014) Annex 4.
7 G	 Wandesforde‐Smith	 and	 NSJ	 Watts,	 ‘Wildlife	 Conservation	 and	 Protected	 Areas:	
Politics,	 Procedure,	 and	 the	 Performance	 of	 Failure	 under	 the	 EU	 Birds	 and	 Habitats	
Directives’	 (2014)	 17	 Journal	 of	 International	Wildlife	 Law	 and	 Policy	 62;	 F	 Kistenkas,	
‘Rethinking	 European	 Nature	 Conservation	 Legislation:	 Towards	 Sustainable	
Development’	(2013)	10	Journal	for	European	Environmental	and	Planning	Law	72,	72	and	
83;	 H	 Schoukens,	 ‘Habitats	 Restoration	 Measures	 as	 Facilitators	 for	 Economic	
Development	within	the	Context	of	EU	Habitats	Directive:	Balancing	No	Net	Loss	with	
the	Preventive	Approach?’	(2017)	29	Journal	of	Environmental	Law	47;	H	Schoukens	and	
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Email: l.squintani@rug.nl The Habitats Directive and, more specifically, its provisions on site protection have 
been	the	subject	of	several	judgments	by	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	Union.	
These judgments have progressively clarified the balance between nature conserva‐
tion	interests	and	economic	ones.	Following	a	recent	judgment	of	the	Court	about	
the managing of nitrogen deposition in Natura 2000 sites, this contribution highlights 
the known and unknown aspects of this legal field. It underlines in particular the im‐
portance of further clarification of the standards to pursue a programmatic approach 
in nature conservation and to evaluate science‐based evidence in court.
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concept	of	a	 ‘mitigation	measure’	was	introduced	by	governmental	
agencies in some countries exactly with the purpose of relaxing the 
stringency of EU nature conservation law.8 This concept has explic‐
itly or implicitly been used in several Member States in many cases, 
without	the	judiciary	asking	for	a	preliminary	ruling	by	the	Court	of	
Justice	of	the	European	Union	(CJEU).9
Eventually, national courts asked preliminary questions and, in a 
series of judgments,10	the	Court	of	Justice	has	clarified	the	scope	of	
public authorities’ discretion to establish mitigation measures under 
the Directive. In November 2018, the latest of such judgments was 
delivered	at	the	request	of	the	Dutch	Council	of	State.11 After provid‐
ing a summary of the judgment (Section 2), this contribution analyses 
the developments brought about by it, regarding two of the four crite‐
ria on the establishment of mitigation measures (Section 3). This analy‐
sis shows the limited room for manoeuvre left to the Member States by 
the judgment. This leads to a reflection on the role of a programmatic 
approach in the field of nature conservation law (Section 4), and some 
preliminary consideration on the way forward (Section 5).
2  | SUMMARY OF THE C A SE
To regulate the deposition of nitrogen into the environment, the 
Netherlands has adopted a programmatic approach to nitrogen (in 
Dutch: Programma Aanpak Stikstof	 2015–2021,	 PAS).	 This	 approach	
does not only aim to conserve and restore Natura 2000 sites, but also 
at enabling economic activities that cause nitrogen deposition in those 
sites.	The	PAS	makes	use	of	both	source‐based	measures	–	such	as	the	
reduction of emissions from stables and measures for low‐emission 
fertilizers – and site‐specific measures – such as hydrological measures 
and additional vegetation measures – supplementary to the regular 
management of the Natura 2000 sites. These measures are expected 
to lead to a decrease of nitrogen depositions. This decrease is partially 
used to expand the room for deposition. What matters is that, on bal‐
ance, a predetermined limit value for deposition is not crossed. 
Pursuant	 to	 this	 balancing	 approach,	 projects	 and	 other	 operations	
which	cause	nitrogen	deposition	not	exceeding	a	limit	value	of	0.05 mol	
N/ha/yr	are	allowed	without	prior	authorization.	Projects	and	other	
operations which cause nitrogen deposition staying between 0.05 and 
1 mol	 N/ha/yr	 are	 allowed	 without	 prior	 authorization	 as	 well,	 but	
must	be	notified	to	the	competent	authority.	Projects	leading	to	higher	
depositions	are	subject	to	an	‘appropriate	assessment’.	This	appropri‐
ate assessment, however, is not project‐specific. Instead, the assess‐
ment	takes	place	at	 the	 level	of	 the	PAS	and	takes	 into	account	the	
balancing approach. This means that a permit may be granted for pro‐
jects and operations that do not result in an increase of nitrogen depo‐
sition, even though this is only on balance.12 If on balance there is an 
increase in nitrogen deposition, the permit may still be granted, by 
making	use	of	the	room	for	deposition	stored	within	the	PAS,	until	all	
additional depositions are covered.13
This approach led to the granting of permits to enlarge the estab‐
lishment or expansion of dairy, pig and poultry farms in the Netherlands. 
Nongovernmental organizations challenged the application of this ap‐




tions, but, until the present cases, it had never made a referral for a 
preliminary	 ruling	 to	disband	the	appeals	and	uphold	 the	PAS.14 It is 
probably thanks to the clarification on the interpretation of Article 6(3) 
of the Directive in Orleans15	that	the	Council	of	State	finally	decided	to	
stay	the	proceedings	and	seek	guidance	from	the	CJEU.
The	Court	of	 Justice	 reformulated	 the	questions	posed	by	 the	
Council	of	State	into	seven	questions,16 five of which are relevant for 
this analysis:
(i) [W]hether Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive must be interpreted 
as meaning that the grazing of cattle and the application of fertilisers 
on the surface of land or below its surface in the vicinity of Natura 
2000 sites may be classified as a ‘project’ within the meaning of that 
provision, on the ground that they are likely to have significant conse‐
quences for those sites, even if those activities, in so far as they are not 
a physical intervention in the natural surroundings, do not constitute 
a ‘project’ within the meaning of Article 1(2)(a) of the EIA [environ‐
mental impact assessment] Directive.17
(ii) [W]hether Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive must be interpreted as 
precluding national programmatic legislation which allows the compe‐
tent authorities to authorise projects on the basis of an ‘appropriate as‐
sessment’ within the meaning of that provision, carried out in advance 
and in which a specific overall amount of nitrogen deposition has been 
deemed compatible with that legislation’s objectives of protection.18
8 On	 this	 concept,	 see	 RHW	 Frins,	 ‘Mitigatie,	 Compensatie	 en	 Soldering	 in	 het	
Omgevingsrecht’	(Stichting	Instituut	voor	Bouwrecht	2016).
9 L	 Squintani	 et	 al,	 ‘Mitigation	 and	 Compensation	 Measures	 under	 the	 EU	 Habitats	
Directive in Selected Member States’ (2019) 1 European Energy and Environmental Law 
Review	2.
10 In	 particular,	 Case	 C‐127/02,	 Landelijke Vereniging tot Behoud van de Waddenzee and 
Nederlandse Vereniging tot Bescherming van Vogels v Staatssecretaris van Landbouw, 
Natuurbeheer en Visserij (Waddenzee),	ECLI:EU:C:2004:482;	Case	C‐521/12,	T.C. Briels and 
Others v Minister van Infrastructuur en Milieu (Briels),	ECLI:EU:C:2014:330;	Case	C‐258/11,	
Peter Sweetman and Others v An Bord Pleanála (Sweetman),	 ECLI:EU:C:2013:220;	 Joined	
Cases	 C‐387/15	 and	 388/15,	 Hilde Orleans and Others v Vlaams Gewest (Orleans), 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:583.
11 Joined	Cases	C‐293/17	and	C‐294/17,	Coöperatie Mobilisation for the Environment UA and 
Vereniging Leefmilieu v College van Gedeputeerde Staten van Limburg and College van 
Gedeputeerde Staten van Gelderland,	ECLI:EU:C:2018:882	(PAS	judgment).
12 Opinion	of	AG	Kokott,	Joined	Cases	C‐293/17	and	C‐294/17,	Coöperatie Mobilisation for 
the Environment UA and others v College van Gedeputeerde Staten van Limburg and others, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:622.
13 ibid.
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(iii) [W]hether Article 6(2) and (3) of the Habitats Directive must be in‐
terpreted as precluding national programmatic legislation, such as 
that at issue in the main proceedings, exempting certain projects 
which do not exceed a certain threshold value or a certain limit value 
in terms of nitrogen deposition from the requirement for individual 
approval, since the cumulative effects of all the plans or projects likely 
to create such deposition were subject in advance to an ‘appropriate 
assessment’ within the meaning of Article 6(3) of that directive.19
(iv) [W]hether Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive must be interpreted 
as not precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main 
proceedings, which allows a certain category of projects, in the pres‐
ent case the application of fertilisers on the surface of land or below 
its surface and the grazing of cattle, to be implemented without being 
subject to a permit requirement and, accordingly, to an individualised 
appropriate assessment of its implications for the sites concerned, 
since that legislation is itself based on an ‘appropriate assessment’ 
within the meaning of that provision.20
(v) [W]hether, and under which conditions, an ‘appropriate assessment’ 
within the meaning of Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive may take 
into account the existence of ‘conservation measures’ within the 
meaning of paragraph 1 of that article, ‘preventive measures’ within 
the meaning of paragraph 2 of that article, measures specifically ad‐
opted for a programme such as that at issue in the main proceedings 
or ‘autonomous’ measures, in so far as those measures are not part of 
that programme.21
Largely	following	the	opinion	of	Advocate	General	Kokott,	the	Court	
of Justice embraced the idea of pursuing a programmatic approach 
under the Directive, as long as a series of strict conditions are re‐
spected – which, in the Netherlands, is actually not the case.22 The 
Court	of	Justice	concluded	that:
• The grazing of cattle and the application of fertilizers on the sur‐
face of land or below its surface in the vicinity of Natura 2000 
sites	may	be	classified	as	a	‘project’	under	the	Habitats	Directive.
• Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive does not preclude national 
programmatic legislation which allows the competent authorities 
to	authorize	projects	on	the	basis	of	an	‘appropriate	assessment’,	
carried out in advance and in which a specific overall amount of 
nitrogen deposition has been deemed compatible with that legis‐
lation’s objectives of protection. That is so, however, only in so far 
as a thorough and in‐depth examination of the scientific sound‐
ness of that assessment makes it possible to ensure that there is 
no reasonable scientific doubt as to the absence of adverse ef‐
fects of each plan or project on the integrity of the site concerned.
• The same conclusion and condition apply to the exemption of 
certain projects which do not exceed a certain threshold value 
or a certain limit value in terms of nitrogen deposition from the 
requirement for individual approval.
• Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive precludes national program‐
matic legislation, which allows a certain category of projects to be 
implemented without being subject to a permit requirement and, 
accordingly, to an individualized appropriate assessment of its im‐
plications for the Natura 2000 sites concerned. An exception to 
this finding is possible if objective circumstances allow to rule out 
with certainty any possibility that those projects, individually or in 




measures’ within the meaning of Article 6(2), measures specifi‐
cally adopted for a programme such as that at issue in the main 
proceedings	or	 ‘autonomous’	measures,	 in	 so	 far	 as	 those	mea‐
sures are not part of that programme, if the expected benefits of 
those measures are not certain at the time of that assessment.
3  | THE FOUR CRITERIA TO ESTABLISH A 
MITIGATION ME A SURE
3.1 | Mitigation measures in context
Article	6	of	the	Habitats	Directive	gives	‘teeth’	to	the	Directive23 by 
establishing proactive, preventive and procedural requirements for 
the conservation of Natura 2000 sites.24 This provision refers to 
three kinds of measures: conservation, preventive and compensatory 
measures.	It	does	not	refer	to	mitigation	measures.	Before	discussing	
what the latter measures are, it is important to briefly explain what 
the former three measures are, in order to distinguish between them.
Conservation measures are covered by Article 6(1) of the 
Directive. These measures focus on positive and proactive interven‐
tions to maintain and improve the status of conservation of a Natura 
















Tiger’	 in	G	 Jones	 (ed),	The Habitats Directive: A Developer’s Obstacle Course (Hart 2012) 
103.	This	statement	applies	only	to	the	protection	of	‘core’	areas.	Conversely,	for	non‐core	
areas	 the	 binding	 force	 of	 the	 Directive	 can	 be	 questioned;	 see	 L	 Squintani,	 ‘The	
Development	of	Ecological	Corridors’	(2012)	9	Journal	for	European	Environmental	and	
Planning	Law	180.
24 On	 the	 selection	process,	 see	H	Schoukens	 and	HE	Woldendorp,	 ‘Site	 Selection	 and	
Designation	under	the	Habitats	and	Birds	Directives’	in	CH	Born	et	al	(eds),	The Habitats 
Directive in its EU Environmental Law Context – European Nature’s Best Hope?	 (Routledge	
2015) 31.
25 Commission	 (EU),	 ‘Managing	 Natura	 2000	 Sites:	 The	 Provisions	 of	 Article	 6	 of	 the	
“Habitats”	Directive	92/43/EEC’	(2000)	<http://ec.europa.eu/envir	onmen	t/natur	e/natur	
a2000/ manag ement/ docs/art6/provi sion_of_art6_en.pdf> 17–21.
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outside the realm of this concept.26 Preventive measures are envis‐
aged under Article 6(2) of the Directive and aim at avoiding deterio‐
ration, similarly to conservation measures.27 Yet these kind of 
measures do not need to take the form of positive action, as in the 
context of Article 6(1). Non‐action is also a form of preventive mea‐
sure, if it prevents damage from occurring. What matters under this 
provision is avoiding disturbance that is likely to affect the objectives 
of the Directive significantly, particularly its conservation objectives 
in relation to Natura 2000 sites.28
Compensation measures are mentioned in Article 6(4) of the 
Directive, which establishes an exception to the obligation contained 
in Article 6(3). Together, Articles 6(3) and 6(4) describe a two‐step – 
or, in case the derogation clause is used, a three‐step – procedure for 
granting development consent to plans or projects likely to have a 
significant effect on a Natura 2000 site,29	based	on	a	‘first	come,	first	
serve’ approach.30	The	concepts	of	‘plan’	(such	as	land‐use	plans,	sec‐
toral	plans,	etc.)	and	‘projects’	(such	as	construction	works	or	other	
interventions in the natural environment) have to be interpreted 
broadly,31 and include also developments outside a Natura 2000 site, 
which	are	likely	to	have	a	significant	effect	on	it	(the	so‐called	‘exter‐
nal effect’).32 In light of the precautionary principle, the assessment 
of the effects of plans of projects inside or outside Natura 2000 sites 
– either individually or in combination with other plans or projects 
(so‐called cumulative impacts) – is based on the likelihood of effects, 
not on their certainty.33 If the screening phase indicates the presence 
of a potentially significant negative effect, an appropriate assessment 
needs to be performed, in light of the site’s ecological functions and 
conservation objectives.34 A negative outcome should lead to the re‐
fusal of authorization.
Yet, Article 6(4) of the Directive specifies that if, in spite of a neg‐
ative assessment of the implications for the site and in the absence of 
alternative solutions, a plan or project must nevertheless be carried 
out for imperative reasons of overriding public interest, a Member 
State must take all compensatory measures necessary to ensure that 
the overall coherence of a Natura 2000 site is guaranteed.35 All the 
constitutive elements of this derogation clause have to be interpreted 
restrictively,36 for balancing environmental protection and economic 
development.37 In particular, the concept of compensation measures 
entails, typically, the designation of like‐for‐like replacement habi‐
tat.38	In	the	view	of	the	European	Commission,	what	matters	is	that	
the function performed by the affected site is successfully recreated 
elsewhere.39
Adequate implementation and enforcement of Article 6 of the 
Directive strengthens nature conservation.40 Yet the complex re‐
lationship between Articles 6(3) and 6(4) has led to uncertainty as 
to	 what	 ‘adequately	 implemented	 and	 enforced’	 means,41 and 
where	 ‘gold‐plating’	 starts.42 In particular, in certain Member 
States questions have arisen on the extent to which measures 
adopted to avoid damage can be taken into account in concluding 
26 Orleans (n 10) para 38.
27 The	 terminology	 conservation and preventive	 measures	 are	 used	 by	 the	 CJEU	 in	 the	
Orleans case, ibid. On the relationship between this provision and legal certainty, see H 
Schoukens,	 ‘Ongoing	Activities	and	Natura	2000:	Biodiversity	Protection	vs	Legitimate	
Expectations’	(2014)	11	Journal	for	European	Environmental	and	Planning	Law	1,	1.
28 Case	C‐399/14,	Grüne Liga Sachsen and Others,	ECLI:EU:C:2016:10	para	41;	on	the	con‐
cept	 of	 ‘significance’,	 in	 particular,	 see	 Case	 C‐355/90,	 Commission v Spain (Santoña 





Journal of Environmental Law 194.
31 On	the	concepts	of	plans	and	projects,	see	de	Sadeleer	(n	29)	286–294.
32 Joined	Cases	C‐293/17	and	C‐294/17,	Coöperatie Mobilisation for the Environment UA and 
Others v College van gedeputeerde staten van Limburg and Others,	 ECLI:EU:C:2018:882;	
which	aims	at	clarifying	the	linkage	between	the	concept	of	‘project’	under	the	Habitats	
Directive with that followed under the EIA Directive.
33 de	 Sadeleer	 (n	 29)	 286–294;	 see	 also	 Schoukens	 (n	 7);	Waddenzee (n 10) para 36; E 
Stokes,	‘Liberalising	the	Threshold	of	Precaution:	Cockle	Fishing,	the	Habitats	Directive,	
and Evidence of a New Understanding of “Scientific Uncertainty”’ (2005) 7 Environmental 
Law	 Review	 206;	 and	 J	 Verschuuren,	 ‘Shellfish	 for	 Fishermen	 or	 for	 Birds?	 Article	 6	
Habitats	Directive	and	the	Precautionary	Principle’	 (2005)	17	Journal	of	Environmental	
Law 265.
34 Sweetman (n 10) paras 31ff.
35 Specifically	 on	 this	 provision,	 see	 A	 Nollkaemper,	 ‘Habitat	 Protection	 in	 European	
Community	 Law:	 Evolving	 Conceptions	 of	 a	 Balance	 of	 Interests’	 (1997)	 9	 Journal	 of	
Environmental	 Law	271;	 R	Clutten	 and	 I	 Tafur,	 ‘Are	 Imperative	 Reasons	 Imperiling	 the	
Habitats	Directive?	An	Assessment	of	Article	6(4)	and	the	IROPI	Exception’	in	G	Jones	(ed),	
The Habitats Directive: A Developer’s Obstacle Course?	 (Hart	 2012)	 167;	 L	 Krämer,	 ‘The	
European	Commission’s	Opinions	under	Article	6(4)	of	the	Habitats	Directive’	(2009)	21	
Journal	of	Environmental	Law	59;	CP	Rodgers,	The Law of Nature Conservation: Property, 
Environment, and the Limits of Law	(Oxford	University	Press	2013)	225–232;	de	Sadeleer	(n	
29).	Projects	authorized	on	the	basis	of	Article	6(4)	of	the	Directive	have	been	called	‘un‐
sustainable development’ projects; see Schoukens (n 7) 52.
36 See	most	notably	Case	C‐399/14,	Grüne Liga Sachsen eV and Others v Freistaat Sachsen 
(Grüne Liga Sachsen),	 ECLI:EU:C:2016:10	 paras	 72	 and	 73;	 See	 also	 Commission	 (EU),	
‘Guidance	on	Article	6(4)	of	the	“Habitats	Directive”	92/42/EEC’	(January	2007).	On	the	
Commission’s	 approach,	 see	 D	 McGillivray,	 ‘Compensating	 Biodiversity	 Loss:	 The	 EU	
Commission’s	Approach	to	Compensation	under	Article	6	of	the	Habitats	Directive’	(2012)	




40 JV	 Lopez‐Bao	 et	 al,	 ‘Toothless	Wildlife	 Protection	 Laws’	 (2015)	 24	 Biodiversity	 and	
Conservation	2105;	PF	Donald	et	al,	‘International	Conservation	Policy	Delivers	Benefits	
for	Birds	in	Europe’	(2007)	317	Science	810;	G	Chapron	et	al,	‘Recovery	of	Large	Carnivores	
in Europe’s Modern Human‐dominated Landscapes’ (2014) 346 Science 1517; Schoukens 
(n 7).
41 See	especially	the	negative	reactions	in	literature	about	a	strict	reading	of	these	provi‐
sions	 from	 an	 economic	 development	 perspective;	 Schoukens	 and	 Cliquet	 (n	 7);	 JMIJ	
Zijlmans	and	HE	Woldendorp,	‘Compensation	and	Mitigation:	Tinkering	with	Natura	2000	
Protection	 Law’	 (2014)	 10	 Utrecht	 Law	 Review	 172;	 J	 Verschuuren,	 ‘Climate	 Change:	
Rethinking	Restoration	in	the	European	Union’s	Birds	and	Habitats	Directive’	 (2010)	28	




Press	2019);	L	Squintani,	Gold‐plating of European Environmental Law	 (PhD	Dissertation,	
University	of	Groningen	2013);	HT	Anker	et	al,	‘Coping	with	EU	Environmental	Legislation:	
Transposition	Principles	 and	Practices’	 (2015)	27	 Journal	 of	 Environmental	 Law	17;	 JH	




Climate Law in EU Member States (Edward Elgar 2012) 67. For a specific application of this 
concept	to	nature	conservation	in	the	Netherlands,	see	L	Squintani,	‘The	Development	of	
Ecological	Corridors’	(2012)	9	Journal	for	European	Environmental	and	Planning	Law	180;	
and	 L	 Squintani	 and	 J	 Zijlmans,	 ‘“Nationale	 Koppen”	 en	 de	 Doorwerking	 van	
Natuurbeschermingsverdragen’	 (2013)	3	Milieu	en	Recht	158;	 for	 the	United	Kingdom,	
see	R	Morris,	 ‘The	Application	of	the	Habitats	Directive	in	the	UK:	Compliance	or	Gold	
Plating?’	(2011)	28	Land	Use	Policy	361.
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that no significant adverse effect will occur.43 It is here that the 
concept of mitigation measures enters into the legal discussion 
under Article 6 of the Directive, creating much uncertainty,44 and 
potential abuses.45
Thanks to the judgments in the Waddenzee, Sweetman, Briels and 
Orleans cases,46 it can confidently be established that mitigation 
measures are allowed under the Habitats Directive only if four cu‐
mulative requirements are met:47
(i) the measure aims at preventing the damage caused by a specific 
plan/project (functional linkage criterion);
(ii) the measure must ensure that this damage (specificity criterion);
(iii) will be prevented (prevention criterion); and
(iv) that there is no doubt about this preventive effect (no‐doubts 
criterion).
In Sweetman,	the	Court	clarified	that	the	specificity	criterion	refers	to	
each individual conservation objective, justifying the designation of 
that	site	in	the	list	of	Sites	of	Community	Importance	(SCIs)	in	accor‐
dance with the Directive.48 Similarly, from Briels it is clear that, under 
the prevention criterion, measures provided to replace a damaged 
area with another cannot be taken into account in the assessment of 
the implications of a project provided for in Article 6(3).49 In the judg‐
ment	under	review,	the	Court	confirmed	both	criteria	by	stating:
… the case‐law relating to Article 6 of the Habitats 
Directive requires a distinction to be drawn between pro‐
tective measures forming part of the plan or project at 
issue and intended to avoid or reduce any direct adverse 
effects caused by it, in order to ensure that that plan or 
project does not adversely affect the integrity of the sites 
concerned, which are covered by Article 6(3), and mea‐
sures which, in accordance with Article 6(4), are aimed 
at compensating for the negative effects of the plan or 
project on that site and cannot be taken into account in 
the assessment of the implications of that plan or project 
on that site …
Moreover, according to the Court’s case‐law, it is only 
when it is sufficiently certain that a measure will make an 
effective contribution to avoiding harm to the integrity of 
the site concerned, by guaranteeing beyond all reason‐
able doubt that the plan or project at issue will not ad‐
versely affect the integrity of that site, that such a 
measure may be taken into consideration in the ‘appro‐
priate assessment’ within the meaning of Article 6(3) of 
the Habitats Directive …50
The	PAS	judgment	provides	further	clarification	of	the	functional	
linkage criterion (i) and of the no‐doubts criterion (ii), as further dis‐
cussed below.




defines this concept without linking it to that used in the EIA Directive, 
that is, by covering activities not covered by the EIA Directive. Most 
importantly,	the	Court	defines	it	by	linking	its	meaning	to	the	effects	of	
the	activities	on	the	protected	site.	Indeed,	the	Court	states	that	it	 is	
important to examine whether such activities are likely to have a signifi‐
cant effect on a protected site.51 This is an effects‐based test, which is 
capable of covering any kind of activity, even the spreading of 
fertilizers.
In the context of the establishment of mitigation measures, fol‐
lowing Briels, it remained unclear whether mitigation measures 
have	to	be	‘functionally’	 linked	to	a	project	development,	that	is,	
whether the proposed measures are part of the scrutinized project 
or of a mitigation scheme or restoration programme that does not 
take into account the specific project under scrutiny.52 Following 
Orleans,53 the present judgment confirms that a proposed mitiga‐
tion measure must aim at avoiding the damage caused by the plan 
or project under scrutiny specifically. Management plans and ge‐
neric restoration measures taken under Articles 6(1) and 6(2) of 
the Habitats Directive can be taken into account under the 
43 This	has	particularly	been	the	case	in	the	Netherlands,	see	Zijlmans	and	Woldendorp	(n	
41); Schoukens (n 7).
44 On	the	lack	of	full	conceptual	clarity,	see	also	D	McGillivray,	‘Mitigation,	Compensation	
and	 Conservation:	 Screening	 for	 Appropriate	 Assessment	 Under	 the	 EU	 Habitats	
Directive’	(2011)	8	Journal	for	European	Environmental	and	Planning	Law	329,	336;	and	G	
van	 Hoorick,	 ‘Compensatory	 Measures	 for	 Large‐scale	 Projects	 in	 European	 Nature	
Conservation	Law	after	the	Briels	Case’	in	Vanheusden	and	Squintani	(n	4)	321.	The	con‐
cepts of mitigation and compensation measures are also relevant in the context of the 
discussions	on	‘biodiversity	offsetting’	and	‘no	net	loss’;	see	R	Lapeyre,	G	Froger	and	M	
Hrabanski,	 ‘Biodiversity	Offsets	 as	Market‐based	 Instruments	 for	 Ecosystem	Services?	
From	Discourse	 to	 Practices’	 (2015)	 15	 Ecosystem	 Services	 125;	 C	 Bonneuil,	 ‘Tell	Me	
Where	 You	 Come	 From,	 I	 Will	 Tell	 You	 Who	 You	 Are:	 A	 Genealogy	 of	 Biodiversity	
Offsetting	Mechanism	in	Historical	Context’	(2015)	192	Biology	Conservation	485;	BBOP	




45 On	 the	use	or	misuse	of	offsetting,	 see	JD	Pilgrim	et	al,	 ‘A	Process	 for	Assessing	 the	
Offsettability	of	Biodiversity	Impacts’	(2013)	6	Conservation	Letters	376;	F	Quétier	et	al,	
‘No	Net	Loss	of	Biodiversity	or	Paper	Offsets?	A	Critical	Review	of	the	French	No	Net	Loss	
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concept of mitigation measures when scrutinizing a specific proj‐
ect only if they specifically address the negative effects of that 
project.54
What	is	new	in	the	PAS	judgment	is	that	this	linkage	can	also	
take place at the plan level, and does not need to take place at the 
level of a specific decision. More precisely, while granting authori‐
zation for a specific project, reference can be made to the positive 
effects of measures specifically aiming at addressing that project 
as assessed under the plan. Indeed, after quoting the text of 
Article 6(3) of the Directive, which requires an individual assess‐
ment	of	plans	and	projects,	the	Court	of	Justice	explains	the	ratio 
legis	of	such	a	provision.	According	to	the	Court,	the	appropriate	
assessment of the implications of the plan or project for the site 
concerned implies that all the aspects of the plan or project which 
can, either individually or in combination with other plans or proj‐
ects, affect the conservation objectives of that site, must be iden‐
tified.55 What matters is that an individual assessment takes place, 
not when in the chain of policy instruments to protect the environ‐
ment (i.e. policies, plans and specific decisions) such assessment 
takes place.
Accordingly, such an individual assessment can also take place at 
the plan level. What matters is that there is no reasonable scientific 
doubt as to the absence of adverse effects of each plan or project on 
the integrity of the site concerned.56 Therefore, there is no de‐linking 
effect, meaning that the conservation goals of the Directive can be 
used to review the appropriateness of the assessment of a specific 
plan, differently than in other fields of EU environmental law, such as 
under the Nitrates Directive.57	The	Court	refers	to	the	need	of	ensur‐
ing that those projects, individually or cumulatively considered, do not 
affect the goals of the Directive, both in paragraph 112 – where the 
Court	of	Justice	allows	exempting	certain	projects	which	do	not	ex‐
ceed a certain threshold from the individual approval requirement – 
and	in	paragraph	120,	where	the	Court	of	Justice	prohibits	excluding	
a certain category of projects from the individual approval 
requirement.58
3.3 | The no‐doubts criterion
The	 use	 of	 the	 adverb	 ‘likely’	 in	 Article	 6(3)	 of	 the	Directive	was	
clearly	linked	to	the	precautionary	principle	by	the	Court	of	Justice	
already in the Waddenzee case.59 Since then, the requirement that 
there should be no scientific doubt about the ability to prevent the 
specific damage of a specific project has gained clarity. In the 
present	judgment,	the	Court	of	Justice	made	clear	that	there	are	two 
ways of complying with this criterion.
First, a proposed measure can qualify as a mitigation measure 
under Article 6(3) of the Directive if, at the moment of the authoriza‐
tion	of	the	plan	or	project,	‘the	procedures	needed	to	accomplish	the	
alleged mitigation measures have already been carried out’.60	Clearly,	
the implementation of a mitigation measure makes it easier to analyse 
whether the significant negative effects of a plan or project have been 
avoided or not.
This approach to the no‐doubts criterion is a very stringent 
one. It stems from the Orleans	case,	in	which	the	Court	of	Justice	
ruled that only those measures which are completed at the mo‐
ment of the appropriate assessment can be taken into account as 
mitigation measures.61 Orleans concerned the development of a 
large	 part	 of	 the	 port	 of	 Antwerp	 (Belgium),	 affecting	 a	 Natura	
2000	site.	The	Court	found	that	the	Belgian	Regional	Development	
Implementation	Plan	allowing	the	project	only	did	so	after	the	sus‐
tainable establishment of habitats and habitats of species in core 
ecological	 areas.	 Second,	 the	 Court	 ruled	 that	 a	 decision	would	
have to declare that habitats in the nature reserves had in fact 
been sustainably created, and the application for a planning permit 
relating to implementing the intended use of the area concerned 
would also have had to include that decision. Accordingly, the neg‐
ative effects would have taken place only after that certainty re‐
garding the effectiveness of the positive effects had been proven. 
Yet,	the	Court	ruled	that	such	certainty	would	have	been	acquired	
only after the plan had been adopted, and thus that the proposed 
measures could not qualify as mitigation measures under Article 
6(3) of the Directive.
The second way in which a measure could qualify as a mitiga‐
tion measure under Article 6(3) of the Directive is when there is no 
scientific doubt about the effectiveness of the proposed measure. 
This means that, even when a measure has not been carried out yet, 
it is still possible to speak of a mitigation measure. What matters is 
that there is scientific certainty about the effectiveness of such a 
measure, thus avoiding the significant damage that would other‐
wise occur. This criterion is clearly less demanding than the previ‐
ous one. Still, the question is when scientific certainty exists about 
the effectiveness of a measure. This criterion could therefore be 
more difficult to fulfil in practice than it seems. It is still unclear 
what	 burden	 of	 proof	 the	 Court	would	 consider	 to	 be	 sufficient	
under	 this	approach.	 In	 the	present	 judgment,	 the	Court	 left	 this	
matter to the national court to decide, in an exercise of judicial sub‐
sidiarity.62	Yet,	 it	 cannot	be	discounted	 that	 the	Court	of	 Justice	













61 See,	 e.g.,	 J	 Zijlmans,	 ‘Verdere	Verheldering	 van	het	Begrip	Mitigerende	Maatregelen’	
(2016) 8 Jurisprudentie Milieurecht 870.
62 On	 this	 practice	 and	 for	 more	 references,	 see	 S	 Bogojevic,	 ‘Judicial	 Protection	 of	
Individual	Applicants	Revisited:	Access	to	Justice	through	the	Prism	of	Judicial	Subsidiarity’	
(2015) 33 Yearbook of European Law 1.
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4  | THE ROOM FOR A PROGR AMMATIC 
APPROACH IN EU NATURE CONSERVATION 
L AW
The	main	 finding	 in	 the	PAS	 judgment	 is	 that	 a	 programmatic	 ap‐
proach under Article 6(3) of the Directive is allowed – albeit under 
strict conditions. At first glance, the Dutch government could be said 
to have satisfied the Directive’s requirements. A closer look, based 
on the analysis presented above, tells a different story, largely in line 
with the doubts expressed in literature prior to the judgment.63
First,	the	Court	of	Justice	enlarged	the	scope	of	application	of	
Article 6(3) of the Directive. Many more activities fall under this 
provision than previously thought. Indeed, the effects‐based ap‐
proach	to	the	concepts	of	‘plan’	and	‘project’	enlarges	the	scope	of	
Article 6(3) of the Directive to such an extent that it could even 
encompass activities fostering, or, at least, not halting, climate 
change.64 If confirmed, the legal framework regulating Member 
State action to combat climate change will be significantly strength‐
ened. While the framework, consisting mainly of the Emissions 
Trading Directive65 and the Effort‐Sharing Decision,66 does not in‐
clude a provision that can (easily) be invoked to halt a specific proj‐
ect,67 Article 6(3) of the Directive aims at doing specifically that. 
This would also mean that, while so far climate change litigation is 
largely developing via the medium of civil law proceedings,68 such 
as the famous Urgenda case,69 it could now also be developed under 
the umbrella of administrative courts, which are usually competent 
to hear cases under Article 6(3) of the Directive.70 If confirmed, this 
would be a completely new dimension of climate change litigation, 
the contours of which are yet to be defined.
Second,	 it	would	be	wrong	to	consider	 the	relevance	of	 the	PAS	
judgment’s finding that a programmatic approach is allowed without 
stressing	 the	 importance	of	 the	conditions	 imposed	by	 the	Court	of	
Justice. The no‐doubts criterion needs to be respected. This is not an 
easy task. The option of having to realize an effective mitigation mea‐
sure prior to granting development consent clearly places a very high 
burden on the developer and will lead to considerable delays in the re‐
alization of a project. The option of relying on estimations is also not 
easy to comply with, as it requires scientific certainty about the ab‐
sence of doubts concerning the prevention of the damage. In the 
Netherlands, despite the prima facie evaluation in a report commis‐
sioned by the government, some ecologists have already stated that it 
is impossible to prevent damage.71 The status of the soil in Natura 2000 
sites is so deteriorated due to the nitrogen depositions that only 
source‐based measures – that is, reducing the emissions of nitrogen – 
can prevent damage. Any site‐specific measure will not prevent dam‐
age from occurring, but only (partially) remediate it, if at all.72 Hence, 
this option does not seem to exist in the Netherlands. For all those proj‐
ects and plans that do not pursue imperative reasons of overriding pub‐
lic interest, such as many cattle‐related activities, this means that they 
cannot be pursued anymore. New permits should not be granted and 
existing permits reconsidered when updated. In some cases, it is debat‐
able whether existing permits could be withdrawn as a consequence of 
the application of one of the exceptions to the principle of res judicata 
developed	by	the	Court	and	discussed	elsewhere.73 This is most likely 
the	case	for	the	permits	challenged	before	the	Dutch	Council	of	State,	
and whose validity the Dutch court confirmed, without referring the 
matter	to	the	Court	of	Justice,	as	indicated	in	Section	2.74
This finding leads to two considerations. First, in the Netherlands 
some have called for the Habitats Directive to be changed.75 
Comparative	research	shows	that	the	Netherlands	is	not	alone	in	the	
adoption of creative solutions to lower the stringency of Article 6(3) of 
the Directive.76 Accordingly, despite the refit process of the Habitats 
Directive having just been concluded,77 establishing that no change to 
the legal framework is needed, this judgment could reopen that discus‐
sion.	After	all,	when	in	the	1980s	the	Court	of	Justice	gave	a	strict	read‐
ing	of	Article	4(4)	of	the	Birds	Directive,78 Member States reacted by 
introducing Articles 6(3) and 6(4) in the Habitats Directive, and using 
them	to	replace	Article	4(4)	of	the	Birds	Directive,	at	least	under	certain	
conditions.79 From a legal perspective, there is nothing that prevents 
the	Member	 States	 reopening	 the	 discussion	 now	 that	 the	Court	 of	
Justice clarified how stringent Article 6(3) of the Directive actually is.




65 Parliament	 and	 Council	 Directive	 (EC)	 2003/87	 of	 13	 October	 2003	 Establishing	 a	
Scheme	 for	 Greenhouse	 Gas	 Emission	 Allowance	 Trading	 within	 the	 Community	 and	
Amending	Council	Directive	96/61/EC	[2003]	OJ	L275/32.
66 Parliament	 and	 Council	 Decision	 (EC)	 406/2009	 on	 the	 Effort	 of	Member	 States	 to	
Reduce	 their	 Greenhouse	 Gas	 Emissions	 to	 Meet	 the	 Community’s	 Greenhouse	 Gas	
Emission	Reduction	Commitments	up	to	2020	[2009]	OJ	L140/136.
67 On	these	two	acts,	see	respectively	E	Woerdman,	‘The	EU	Greenhouse	Gas	Emissions	
Trading	 Scheme’	 in	 E	Woerdman,	M	 Roggenkamp	 and	M	 Holwerda	 (eds),	 Essential EU 
Climate Law	(Edward	Elgar	2015)	43;	L	Squintani,	‘Regulation	of	Emissions	from	Non‐ETS	
Sectors’ in Woerdman, ibid 96.
68 J	 Jendroska,	M	Reese	and	L	Squintani,	 ‘The	Courts	as	Guardians	of	the	Environment:	
New Developments in Access to Justice and Environmental Litigation’ in J Isted (ed), 
International Comparative Law Guide on Climate Change and Environmental Law	(ICLG	2019)	
5.
69 The	Hague	District	Court	(The	Netherlands)	24	June	2015,	ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7145;	

















78 WPJ	 Wils,	 ‘The	 Birds	 Directive	 15	 Years	 Later:	 A	 Survey	 of	 the	 Case	 Law	 and	 a	
Comparison	with	the	Habitats	Directive’	(1994)	6	Journal	of	Environmental	Law	219,	233;	
with	reference	to	Case	C‐57/89,	Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic 
of Germany,	ECLI:EU:C:1991:89.
79 Habitats	Directive	(n	1)	art	7.
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The	 second	 consideration	 is	 related	 to	 the	 first.	 The	 Court	 of	
Justice assigned the task of applying the no‐doubts criterion to the 
national	court,	which,	in	the	Netherlands,	is	the	Council	of	State.	As	
there are no clear legal requirements about how a national court has 
to comply with the task,80 it can be expected that Member States will 
manufacture science‐based arguments to escape the need to rely on 
Article 6(4) of the Directive. In the Netherlands, when the Briels case 
had to be decided, a second assessment was done, showing no ad‐
verse effect would have occurred, hence reversing the conclusions of 
the first assessment.81	The	Council	of	State	accepted	the	validity	of	
the new appropriate assessment and therefore confirmed the valid‐
ity for the authorization under Article 6(3) of the Directive, without 
making recourse to Article 6(4). I do not argue that the second as‐
sessment was wrong. My argument is that science requires scientific 
knowledge to be evaluated. Indeed, next to science‐based arguments 
(i.e. evidentiary framing) also appeals to emotions via symbolic lan‐
guage (i.e. imaginary framing) can be used to inspire, manage and 
manipulate science, as shown by Wolf and van Dooren.82 It is hence 
important to consider how science‐based arguments can be distin‐
guished from imaginary framing, and how to evaluate the former.
Each Member State has its own approach for the evaluation of 
science‐based arguments in court. A recent comparative study 
shows the existence of an array of approaches.83 Sweden and 
Finland rely on in‐house technical judges to deal with science in 
environmental cases.84 The Netherlands allows the judiciary to use 
an	advisory	body	–	the	‘Foundation	of	Independent	Court	Experts	
in	Environmental	and	Planning	Law’,	composed	of	technical	experts	
– for advice on technical issues.85 Other countries, such as 
Germany,	 rely	on	 the	 investigative	powers	of	 the	 judiciary	 to	 re‐
view the decisions of public authorities.86 Similar powers exist in 
Italy, where courts, however, can only carry out marginal reviews.87 
In	Poland,	none	of	these	options	seems	available	and	it	can	thus	be	
questioned how fit this judicial system is to deal with the task of 
assessing	 scientific	 evidence	 assigned	 by	 the	 Court	 of	 Justice.88 
The lack of harmonization and clear standards on how courts 
should apply the no‐doubts criterion means that in the coming 
years new discussions and preliminary questions can be expected.
Notwithstanding the limits to developing a programmatic ap‐
proach	in	EU	nature	conservation	law,	the	PAS	judgment	makes	it	
clear that such an approach is not prohibited. This is a novelty that 
can lead to new developments in practice and in law. With van 
Rijswick,	I	underlined	the	importance	of	enhancing	legal	certainty	
and adaptability when adopting a programmatic approach.89 First, 
it is necessary to clarify how the Habitats Directive ensures legal 
certainty and adaptability as regards the actors involved in the de‐
cision‐making	process,	 including	whether	the	‘public’	has	the	op‐
portunity to shape the content of programmes – either during the 
decision‐making phase or by means of judicial review. Second, at‐
tention should be given to the manner in which EU nature conser‐
vation law regulates the content of programmes. In this context, it 
is relevant to look at whether there are guidelines or obligations 
concerning the measures which are considered appropriate to 
achieve the conservation goals of a Natura 2000 site; the relation‐
ship between the instruments as part of the content of pro‐
grammes and such material goals; and the regulation of the time 
limits to achieve such material goals or to compensate their dete‐
rioration. Third, the provisions concerning the assessment of the 
results of programmes should be considered by looking at the 
method of assessment used for the material status of Natura 2000 
sites, and the methodology used to establish a causal link between 
the content of programmes and the safeguard/achievement of a 
good status of conservation. It goes beyond the scope of this con‐
tribution to carry out such an analysis.
5  | CONCLUSION
With	 the	PAS	 judgment,	 the	Court	of	 Justice	has	 further	 clarified	
the regulatory framework applying to the protection of Natura 2000 
sites. Four cumulative criteria emerge from a stream of case law, of 
which this judgment is the latest addition. In order to rely on the 
concept	of	 ‘mitigation	measures’,	a	measure	must	comply	with	the	
functional linkage criterion, the specificity criterion, the prevention 
criterion	 and	 the	 no‐doubts	 criterion.	 In	 this	 judgment,	 the	Court	
clarified that the functional linkage criterion and the no‐doubts cri‐
terion do not exclude the use of a programmatic approach. Yet strict 
conditions must be complied with. Most notably, the programmatic 
approach does not have a de‐linking effect. Hence, each individual 
project within the programme must comply with the conservation 
80 M	Eliantonio,	‘The	Impact	of	EU	Law	on	Access	to	Scientific	Knowledge	and	the	Standard	
of	 Review	 in	National	 Environmental	 Litigation:	 A	 Story	 of	Moving	 Targets	 and	Vague	
Guidance’	(2018)	27	European	Energy	and	Environmental	Law	Review	115.
81 L	 Squintani	 and	D	 Annink,	 ‘Judicial	 Cooperation	 in	 Environmental	Matters:	Mapping	







and	 Bolts:	 Scientific	 and	 Technical	 Knowledge	 in	 Environmental	 Litigation:	 National	
Solutions,	EU	Requirements	and	Current	Challenges’	in	L	Squintani	et	al	(eds),	Managing 
Facts and Feelings in Environmental Governance (Edward Elgar 2019) 82.
84 M	Schultz,	‘Scientific	Evidence	in	Court:	The	Use	of	Technical	Judges	in	Swedish	Courts	
for	Better	Integration	of	Scientific	Data	in	Environmental	Decision‐making’	in	Squintani	et	
al	 (n	 83)	 118;	 and	 T	 Paloniitty	 and	 S	 Kangasmaa,	 ‘Securing	 Scientific	 Understanding:	






Matters	 –	 A	 Note	 on	 the	 German	 Legal	 Context’	 (2018)	 27	 European	 Energy	 and	
Environmental	Law	Review	151.
87 R	 Caranta,	 ‘Still	 Searching	 for	 a	 Reliable	 Script:	 Access	 to	 Scientific	 Knowledge	 in	
Environmental Litigation in Italy’ (2018) 27 European Energy and Environmental Law 
Review	158.
88 M	Bar,	 ‘Scientific	Knowledge	in	Environmental	Litigation	before	Polish	Administrative	
Courts:	 A	 Problem	 of	 Compliance	 with	 EU	 Law?’	 (2018)	 27	 European	 Energy	 and	
Environmental	Law	Review	169.
89 Squintani	and	van	Rijswick	(n	57).
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goals envisaged for the Natura 2000 site at stake. Moreover, there 
must be no scientific doubt about this finding. Approaches in several 
Member States will have to change accordingly, potentially including 
the revocation of already granted permits if the conditions for invok‐
ing one of the exceptions to the principle of res judicata applies – as 
it could be the case in the Netherlands.
In light of the above, there seem to be very little, if any, room 
in the Netherlands to justify a programmatic approach to nitrogen 
depositions.	Yet	the	case	law	of	the	Court	of	Justice	has	not	clarified	
what the burden of proof is to establish lack of scientific doubt, and 
each Member State has its own approach to the review of public 
authorities’ reliance on scientific evidence. Hence, it seems likely 
that Member States will seek to continue to spur economic devel‐
opment at the cost of nature conservation by relying on the lack of 
EU standards in this field. Further disputes and related preliminary 
questions can therefore be expected.
More	generally,	 the	PAS	 judgment	has	opened	the	door	to	the	
development of a programmatic approach in the field of EU nature 
conservation law. This is a novelty that necessitates further research 
on how such an approach should be regulated. Follow‐up research 
will have to shed further light on this issue.
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